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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID F. TIBBETTS, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
SUZANNE DANDOY, In Her 
Capacity as Executive 
Director of the Utah 
Department of Health, 
Respondent. 
BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this court pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(a). 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a final order of the Fourth 
District Court granting summary judgment to the respondent 
and denying summary judgment to petitioner. (Record, at 93) 
(hereinafter referred to as "R") The action in the district 
court was commenced pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 26-23-2 
(1953) and sought review of a final determination by the 
Executive Director of the Department of Health denying 
petitioner Medicaid assistance. (R-l) 
Case No. 880063-CA 
Category No. 14 a 
1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Whether respondent erred as a matter of law in 
finding that petitioner's home was not exempt as an asset 
under the Medicaid statute? 
2. Whether respondent should be equitably 
estopped from denying petitioner Medicaid? 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES AND RULES 
• 
The following relevant sources are reproduced in 
the addendum section: 
Utah Code Ann. § 26-23-2(3) 
APA Vol. Ill § 411.1 
45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(3)(B) 
42 C.F.R. §§ 435.812-.814 
42 C.F.R. §§ 435.840-.843 
STATEMENT OF THE CA$E 
This is a review of final agency action by the 
Department of Health upholding a denial of Medicaid benefits 
to petitioner. (R-18) Petitioner originally sought review 
in the district court which issued an order on November 25, 
1987, upholding respondent's action. (R-93) Petitioner 
seeks review of that order in the Court of Appeals. (R-106) 
During December, 1985, petitioner applied for 
retroactive Medicaid benefits to cover the cost of dental 
care needed by his four children. (R-34) Petitioner was 
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advised by caseworkers in respondent's Provo office that his 
children were eligible for Medicaid for the month of Decem-
ber and that he should go ahead and obtain the necessary 
treatment. (R-2Q, 31, 33, 34, 38, 39) Although petitioner 
requested Medicaid coverage, his application was not filed 
until January 3, 1986. (R-33-34) Petitioner paid $87.35 as 
a medical excess for the month of December, since his 
countable income exceeded the basic maintenance standard for 
a family of his size. After the dental treatment had been 
provided, a second caseworker reviewed petitioner's Medicaid 
file on or about March 26, 1986, and concluded that he was 
not eligible because of excess assets. (R-32) The asset 
which allegedly rendered petitioner ineligible for Medicaid 
was a six and one-half acre portion of a lot owned by him in 
Genola, Utah. (R-36-38) At the time of his application, 
petitioner owned an eight acre lot in Genola over which a 
dirt path existed. (R-4-5) The path was used by the city 
of Genola to reach a water tower located to the rear of 
petitioner's property. (R-5) The path divided the eight 
acre plot into six and one-half acres on one side and one 
and one-half acres on the other. (R-4-5) 
A medical excess payment must be paid under Utah's medically needy 
program whenever an applicant's household income exceeds the standard 
set by the state. See discussion, infra, at 5. 
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The second caseworker determined that because of 
the excess assets, petitioner was not eligible for Medicaid 
in December, 1985, and returned the spenddown to him. 
(R-34) Respondent refused Medicaid coverage of the December 
dental treatment. Petitioner then requested a hearing which 
was held on April 9, 1986, before Fair Hearing Officer Neal 
Bernson. (R-31) Petitioner was unrepresented by legal 
counsel at the hearing. (R-31) Officer Bernson issued a 
recommended decision on July 31, 1986, finding that peti-
tionees Medicaid application for December, 1985, had been 
properly denied. (R-19) On or about August 7, 1986, the 
respondent, Executive Director Suzanne Dandoy, adopted the 
hearing officer's recommendation. (R-18) The review in the 
district court followed that decision. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 26-23-2(3), the 
district court reviewed the final agency action under the 
following standard: 
"If the final determination of the executive 
director is consistent with the findings of fact 
and conclusions of law recommended by the hearing 
officer, the court shall review the record and may 
alter the final determination only upon a finding 
that the final determination is capricious, or not 
supported by the evidence." 
This court has held that an appeal from a district court 
which has reviewed an administrative decision is reviewed 
just as if the appeal had come directly from the agency. 
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TechnoMedical Labs v. Securities Division, 744 P.2d 320, 321 
n.l (Ut. App. 1987) The court further noted that the 
standard of review applicable to such reviews is that of 
"reasonableness or rationality." Id*, at 323. The court 
noted: 
Under this standard, the agency's decision will be 
set aside 'only if it is outside the tolerable 
limits of reason1 or fso unreasonable that it must 
be deemed capricious and arbitrary.' Id., at 323. 
The Utah Supreme Court has further held that when an appel-
late court reviews an agency decision, an intervening court 
decision is entitled to no presumption of correctness, since 
the lower court did not have a more advantaged position for 
reviewing the administrative record. Bennion v. Utah State 
Board of Oil, Gas and Minerals, 675 P.2d 1135, 1139 (Ut. 
1983) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Under the federal Medicaid program, an applicant's 
home is excluded as an exempt resource. Respondent is bound 
by the federal regulations and must make a reasonable 
application to individual cases. Respondent interprets the 
federal regulation as exempting a home and an average size 
lot in the community where it is located. Respondent has 
erred in petitioner's case by finding that a path or trail 
across petitioner's property legally divided his property, 
leaving a parcel of land that must be sold. Substantial 
evidence is lacking for the finding that petitioner owned 
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two parcels of land, one of which is subject to sale. 
Respondent's application of the regulation and her own 
policies and procedures is unreasonable in petitioner's 
case. 
Respondent, through her representative caseworkers 
in the Provo 0C0 office, represented to petitioner that his 
children were eligible for Medicaid during December, 1985. 
Petitioner relied on those representations and had certain 
dental work performed. Subsequently, respondent's represen-
tatives disavowed their earlier statements and declared 
petitioner ineligible because of excess assets. Petitioner 
has relied to his detriment and respondent should be equita-
bly estopped from denying him Medicaid benefits. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
The District Court Erred As a Matter of Law In 
Finding That Petitioner's Home Was Not An Exempt 
Asset Under The Medicaid Statute. 
The Medicaid program was established by Congress 
in 1965 as Title XIX of the Social Security Act. The 
program, which is designed to provide federal financial 
assistance to those states choosing to reimburse needy 
persons for certain medical treatment costs, is codified at 
42 U.S.C. § 1396 et seq. Individual states are not required 
to participate in Medicaid, but once they decide to do so, 
they must comply with federal law. Townsend v. Swank, 404 
6 
U*S. 282, 286, 92 S.Ct. 502 (1971) If a state chooses to 
participate in the Medicaid program, the federal government 
will reimburse the state for a portion of the cost. 42 
U.S.C. § 1396b In Utah, approximately seventy percent of 
the Medicaid budget is supplied by the federal participant. 
Medicaid does not provide assistance to every poor 
person in need. The program is intentionally designed to 
provide a health benefit component linked to other financial 
assistance programs. For example, persons qualifying for 
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) are consid-
ered "categorically needy" and are thereby mandatorally 
eligible for Medicaid. 42 U.S.C-. § 1396a(a) (10) (A) (i); 42 
C.F.R. § 435.100 et seq. An optional category of eligibili-
ty, which is the category at issue in this case, is "medi-
cally needy". This classification includes those who have 
income or resources above the limits for AFDC but below the 
state-established "medically needy" limit and who meet all 
other non-eligibility criteria for AFDC. Thus, medically 
needy recipients include persons who are AFDC-like (needy 
children and their parents) and who have income and resourc-
es within the applicable limits. 42 U.S.C. § 
1396a(a)(10)(C) Utah has opted to cover this group of 
individuals and frequently requires payment of a spenddown 
or, the amount by which income exceeds the basic maintenance 
standard, if the applicant's household income exceeds the 
established standard of need for a household of that size. 
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In this case, petitioner's children qualified as medically 
needy children and petitioner was required to pay a 
spenddown in order to receive Medicaid coverage for Decem-
ber, 1985. 
The federal regulations implement the statutory 
authority for extending Medicaid to medically needy individ-
uals. 42 C.F.R. § 435.300 et seq. The regulations provide 
that a state Medicaid agency may provid^ Medicaid to indi-
viduals who have income that meets the standards set forth 
in 42 C.F.R. §§ 435.812-.814 or, if their income exceeds 
these standards, allow eligibility if the incurred medical 
expenses equal the difference between countable income and 
the applicable income standard. Persons qualifying for 
medically needy coverage must also meet the applicable 
resource standards in 42 C.F.R. §§ 435.840-.843. 
The applicable medically needy resource standards 
require that eligibility be determined using a resource 
standard that is based on family size, is uniform for all 
individuals and is reasonable. 42 C.F.R. § 435.840. A 
medically needy resource standard is presumed to be reason-
able if it equals the highest resource standard for the cash 
assistance group or program related to the covered medically 
needy group. In this case, petitioner's family is properly 
classifiable as related to the AFDC cash assistance group. 
Therefore, the AFDC resource standards are applicable to 
petitioner's case. 
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The applicable AFDC resource standards are found 
at 45 C.F.R. § 233.20 (a)(3)(B) and provide in relevant 
part: 
A State Plan ... must ... [s]pecify ... in 
AFDC—The amount of real and personal property 
that can be reserved for each assistance unit 
shall not be in excess of one thousand dollars 
equity value (or such lesser amount as the State 
specifies in its State plan) excluding only: 
(1) The home which is the usual residence of the 
assistance unit; 
* • • « 
The state of Utah implements the federal regula-
tions through its local Office of Community Operations (OCO) 
offices. To aid the local offices, state authorities 
publish volumes of policies and procedures which are to 
guide caseworkers in applying the federal statute and 
regulations. In this case, respondents promulgated APA Vol* 
III § 411.1, which provides in relevant part: 
1. One Home and Lot - All Cases 
Exclude one home...and lot owned or being pur-
chased and occupied by the client. 
a. The lot on which the home stands shall not 
exceed the average size of residential lots in the 
community where it is. Count the equity value of 
property exceeding the average size lot* 
It was this section of respondent's rules that the 
caseworker applied in March, 1986, in finding that petition-
er had excess resources for the medically needy program. 
Although a state participating in the Medicaid 
program is permitted to make eligibility determinations, the 
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Issue of AFDr'eligibility, and i n thi s case Medicaid eligi-
t imate] ;y a qi le st i 01 1 • ::)f federal law. Herndoi i v. 
..'cicrado, 528 p.2d 395 (Colo. App, 1 974) The state of Utah 
. : permittee* to adopt polici es and procedures such as APA 
1.1 , but the i u les adopted must be reasonable 
and ree. n derogation of the federal statute. Rosen v. 
Hursh, i:° T Supp. 322, 324 (D. Minn* 1971) rev'd on other 
grounds, * F 2d 731 Moreover, the state Medi caia partic-
ipant has an affirmative duty to sho\ / the reasonableness of 
1^3 roli~i e • - Amos v. Dept of Health and Resources, 444 
... .-..<. App. 1983) 
:o should first i:e noted that teo applicable 
federal recnr -J - ~ • -. •- * ~ ^ \ 
/J**, milt it i;w!.»v, i!i ^ * *-\- oj.t-v-t.,1^^-^. i * Liu ' ,v. .. *.tii\l ' iv'OIaMx-
size" are not defined ie :ie federal recr . ' ation.- , The 
Jteacrai regulations whj.cn u\^3i LL reasonable . i it , - \ . 
survive judicial scruciii . 'ijreover, the state's policies 
UL^^ ^ ..^ .. applicable,., th.s ease, -he s*-<±te ui Li ah 
tailed :e *r^ responsibility to reasonably ippi^ the federal 
u^ ^pp-iror.: r ^  -n i ^ w e w i n g rhe transcript of 
petitioner's case, that the casework t involved reel let ex 
ini n«'*M*1 i i he T: iii :i i: id tha t: the ' i - , 
thereby effecting a legal division u: ::..:> property into 
separate parcels, one of which qualified as a lot connected 
with his home and the other a parcel subject to sale. At 
one point the caseworker even referred to the one parcel as 
being "across the street." (R-35) Absent from the record, 
however, is any evidence of a route established across 
petitioner's property which could be classified as a legal 
road or some other dividing line having legal status. 
Petitioner testified that the route was more on the order of 
a path or trail, was not blacktopped or maintained by the 
city of Genola and did not appear on an official plat of the 
city. (R-4-5, 46) It appears that the road is no more than 
a vestige of the city's infrequent passage over petitioner's 
property which mushroomed in the caseworker's mind until it 
attained legal status, despite the lack of any reference to 
an easement or right-of-way on the city plat. (R-46) Were 
the caseworker's concept of property division to apply in 
all cases, a footpath developed by school children across a 
Medicaid recipient's property could in time result in 
Medicaid disqualification, since the passage of little feet 
could establish a "road" just as surely as the infrequent 
crossing of city vehicles operated by the City of Genola. 
If the respondent is correct, a farmer's property divided by 
a cowpath could disqualify him from Medicaid. Such results 
would hardly be considered reasonable. 
In addressing the issue of home exemption, respon-
dent ignored her own policies which provide that a lot is 
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excluded if It does n - "ox^ecd the weraqe siz e: residen-
1 lal lots :i 1:1 the •- ...- .-..,.. i 
through introduction cf the piat tna ~ nis let 1.. indeed an 
average size lot fe? tho re^^uni'y c Genola, Utah. (R-46) 
. , <-. • others 
che piat snov;3 tiiar it .j smallei en^n tne majority of 
the properties contained therein. 
; *.;i .;,i..- . •. . -. rid J cal Ltiij Liu1 Ihe UJL owned by 
petitioner is net subdivided is the eity piat introduced at 
the hearing . -p.*^ "-.-.
 : show?* petitioner- bavin 1 loaal 
. ...i <• . J: J-.-.. ^ cie ; L. ••:.:• eiouciesorre 
path ci ;roac" is not even entered on the ciat nap, Pcti -
• ioner';- Ioa?,l description as stated, in a recent tax 
•,,... e^. . ,.-. . .:c2i':'.i.'.: _.; in easement or right-of-way 
over nis lot and shows rxiir ~-s owning an undivided interest 
• • '•* , ' * acres. (R-70) The , ret itioner o\ ms al 1 of t .he 
1 which the pat. ;• . sses .-.no a is evidence of owner-
ship outweighs any supposed division created by the 
caseworker. 
E vei 1 assuming that five acres u- the average size 
lor fe: Genola (which the plat shows is net the case),, 
oetltioncr! s ownership — v eight acre lot does not a 1 i/to~ 
* . i.. eje^er 1 1 . .i. , ... ie for Medicaid. Instead, 
respondent *-;~ regulations provide that only the equity of the 
excess rropertv exceeding the average si ze :i s coi mted Ii 1 
t.... J , ....
 Hi...ce. exceeding the average size lot for the 
1 2 
City of Genola would have questionable equity value, since 
it would be less than the minimum size lot required by the 
city. Moreover, such excess would be restricted in access 
to irrigation water and would have limited agricultural 
value. Clearly, the record does not contain substantial 
evidence of the equity value of property belonging to 
petitioner, regardless of how it is divided. 
POINT II 
Respondents Should Be Equitably Estopped From 
Denying Petitioner Medicaid Benefits. 
A further issue which arises in petitioner's case 
is whether the doctrine of equitable estoppel should apply 
so as to estop respondent from denying petitioner Medicaid 
benefits. It is evident from a review of petitioner's 
hearing transcript that he considered himself misled by 
caseworkers in the Provo OCO office concerning his Medicaid 
eligibility. He testified without contradiction that he was 
told by caseworkers that his children would be eligible for 
Medicaid benefits during the month of December and he should 
go ahead and have the necessary dental work performed. 
(R-31, 33, 34, 38, 39,) Based on the representations by 
respondent's representatives in the Provo OCO office, 
petitioner proceeded to have the dental care performed for 
his children. He testified that he even received a letter 
stating that he had been approved for Medicaid during the 
month of December. (R-33) Petitioner testified that he did 
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not fail to disclose t-ru* property w\ ;o- •- '-he subject of; 
t1 * ^  -:\ r<\-\ - .* . . .„; proper-
ty. - J : >' . ~*^  i' .'jstifled m a t re relied c:. the 
representation that h^ naci coon approved For Medicaid 
a 's;.s\.. . os^i. . . **_•..: ;\;C^, he 
would not have had the dental work performed. (R-4U) The 
hearing examiner I n his findings of fact concluded: 
He called the district office, explained his 
circumstances and was informed that his children 
Id qualify for dental work that needed to be 
Therefore, he had the dental work done a- * 
d for Medical Assistance in January,, 198< 
he was advised t<i. :Ie was even told how much 
~ — *- income to pay which he did on January tijt 
If he is not eligible new based upon excess 
, then he can understand why he would be 
LiiCij-gible for ongoing assistance. l\h"\ however, 
feels that because of the mistake of the district 
office in approving him in error, that the payment 
to the dentist should be made i n behalf of his 
children. 
The doctrine of equitable estoppel \^ weil estab-
lished • ''' : • • :: ; srsr*. lor - - . lr Ce .ebr^ >.J ^1.^ > , _._ __ y ^ 
.udii Liquo: lontro^ commission, ^\Z Jd '&%. b-v *'" 1979) 
the court observed thar equitable es:oppo. jnay be applied 
against the state ever wher : - : ric * - * ntai 
s..*- . . .jcessai \.
 rrevent :;.^;IILOCS* injustice 
and th:; exercise oL governmental powers <;.fcl no- ce Impaired 
ther^b-* ioe West. v. Department of . .•cia. .,:;i ..a.',. 
^•Lvr^a, *h"i I-, h; "•: '* ! - Wash. 1 '""h^  - he I1 ^ n ~ , v4_ ~~^ 
.ur the essential elements f equitable estoppel as follows: 
(1) an admission, statement, or act inconsistent 
with the claim afterwards asserted, 
(2) action by the other party on the faith of 
such admission, statement, or act, and 
(3) injury to such other party resulting from 
allowing the first party to contradict or repudi-
ate such admission, statement, or act. 
Id., at 694. 
In Utah State University v. Sutro & Company, 646 
P.2d 715 (Ut. 1982) the Utah Supreme Court reviewed the long 
history of the doctrine of equitable estoppel and reiterated 
its holding that "estoppel should be allowed as a defense 
against the government where to do otherwise would work a 
serious injustice, and the public interest would not be 
unduly damaged by the interposition of that defense." Id., 
at 719. The court cited with approval the decision in 
United States v. Wharton, 514 F.2d 406 (1975) wherein: 
The court noted the precaution that not every form 
of official misinformation would be sufficient to 
estop the government, but where advice given was 
so closely related to basic fairness and the 
decision-making process, the government should be 
estopped from disavowing the representation made 
because to do so would work a serious injustice on 
the defendant and the interest of the public would 
not be unduly threatened or damaged. 
Utah State University v. Sutro & Company, supra, at 720. 
The court concluded: 
We regard the authorities referred to above as 
well reasoned, with which our sense of justice is 
in harmony, and supportive of the well-recognized 
policy of the law as earlier set forth herein, to 
the effect that the rule which precludes the 
assertion of estoppel against the government is 
sound and generally should be applied, except only 
in appropriate circumstances as hereinabove 
stated, where the interests of justice mandate an 
exception to that general rule. In cases where 
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such an issue arises, the critical inquiry is 
ther it appears that the facts may be found 
A such certainty, and the injustice to be 
fered is of sufficient gravity, to invoke the 
exception. And in case there is doubt on such 
matters, it should be resolved in favor of permit-
ting the party to have a trial of the issue, as 
opposed, to summary rejection thereof. 
Utah State University v. :i\r:ro u Company,
 :supra. ^t ' /* 
Several coui ts - :*hci * :: iscict.ions ^in::; ;:.:^ s 
region have applied the doctrine 01 aquirable estoppel in 
the context of public entit 1 emenr ^  , - Graver *. Aciu • \. and 
F am i ly S e 1 v i c e s I) i v i s i 01 1, - : :.•..- . , C; , hpr: 1 ~" tr.o 
court held that equitable estoppel c nil-i apply - ;: t;.». ;ase 
of a Medicaid recipient whc had been advised rs~' 
children were eligible tor dental coverage a^: *.*c iic-i n o f 
been informed of the /ocd 1 >r prior luthorization. Tie 
court held that- ;• * ' : > - • ' - - -,-^e . n e 
believed, a case . estopping t;Au u jo.noi iiom applying its 
rules had been presented. Id,, at -l *'**. Similarly, in. 
Fi lipo ^.ih^l-?' " : :> :":^ 
the Hawaii Social Serviwe:b ^gcAcj to.--in asserting the inva-
lidity of certain welfare regulation:* when the agency's own 
misfeasance ana nonteasancr- * - - 1 fn 
noncum, _aiice, Id. , -v ... court oDservcc: 
Government, above all, must oe *'.bovc reproach. 
Equity and fairness dictate tha1' it should not be 
permitted to take advantage of its own wrong or 
mistake. R. EL Stearns Co. v. United States, 291 
U.S. 54, 54 S.Ct. 325, 78 L.Ed. 647 (1934). A 
citizen has a., right to expect the same standard of 
honesty, justice and fair dealing in his contact 
wi th the State or other political entity, which he 
i s ] egaJ iv ^-r.--rded in ^ > ^ d^al i ngs wi th o ther 
individuals. Finch v. Matthews, 74 Wash.2d 161, 
433 P.2d 833 (1968). 
Id., at 300. 
For the same reasons set forth in the above-cited 
case law, the doctrine of equitable estoppel should be 
applied in this case. Petitioner dealt honestly with 
respondent in attempting to obtain Medicaid coverage for his 
children's dental needs. He testified repeatedly and 
without contradiction that he had b€*en told by Medicaid 
caseworkers in the Provo office that his children were 
eligible for Medicaid and he should go ahead with the dental 
work. It is clear that he relied to his detriment on a 
representation by respondent that the service would be 
covered. It was not until three months after the represen-
tation that respondent disavowed her earlier statement. A 
manifest injustice would result unless respondent is 
estopped from denying eligibility. The public interest 
would be well served by such a holding, since it would 
promote confidence in the social service system operated by 
the state of Utah. In comparison with the state's overall 
budget, the amount in question is likely small. The sense 
of fairness and prevention of injustice to a vulnerable 
individual would accrue to the state and the public as a 
lasting value. 
17 
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for Medicaid during Decembe:, ±$b-?> -ecauso tnc aonne to was 
living \:\ was exemiy r,he 1 or o' which rh^ hcrc^  w*r ; t_*:^ *•-
'-••'•xis; ... tj. • : . , 
lot. I.JL :.ne community where no 1- voc: Respondent nas failed 
to establish tha*" petitioner owned a separate rarco". * and 
of petitioner was an unreasonable application -. i the federal 
statute -ind regulations, Moreover. : esponden* ru^ 
.t> • ,-2> . • oin de;i_, .ny pc:::ioner Medicare, w.ujp 
net own representations caused him t: acv ~o his detriment. 
For these reason*: petitioner recruests that " V • 
-i.- - . :.A.sti,c: court anc c.,^ c^  ,. rs 
order requiring respondent to award r.im Medicaid benefits 
for the month of December, 1985. 
DATED this 'f day of / 6vyut , 1Q?Q 
MICHAEL E. BULSON 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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name of the department at any time and place, in 
accordance with rules and procedures for administ-
rative hearings adopted by the department. Minutes 
or a summary of the proceeding of such hearing 
shall be taken and filed with the department 
records, together with recommended findings of fact 
and conclusions of law made by the hearing officer, 
from which the executive director shall make a final 
determination. In any such hearing, the hearing 
officer shall' have authority to administer oaths, 
examine witnesses, and issue in the name of the 
department notice of the hearings or subpoenas 
requiring the testimony of witnesses and the prod-
uction of evidence relevant to any matter in the 
hearing. Hearings shall be conducted in a manner 
which guarantees the parties' due process rights. 
This includes, but is not limited to, the right to 
exarriine any evidence presented to the department 
or hearing officer, the right to cross-examine any 
witness, and a prohibition of ex parte communica-
tion between any party and a member of the com-
mittee or the hearing officer. Final rules incorpora-
ting these procedures shall be adopted by the com-
mittee on or before October 1,1988. 
(2) Judicial review of a final determination of the 
executive director may be secured by the aggrieved 
party by filing a petition in the district court within 
30 days after receipt of notice of the executive dir-
ector's final determination. The petition, which 
shall be served upon the executive director, shall 
state the grounds upon which review is sought. With 
his answer, the executive director shall certify and 
file with the court all documents and papers and a 
transcript of all testimony taken in the matter, tog-
ether with the recommended findings of fact and 
conclusions of law of the hearing officer, and the 
final determination of the executive director." " 
(3) If the final determination of the executive 
director is consistent with the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law recommended by the hearing 
officer, the court shall review the record and may 
alter the final determination only upon a finding 
that the final determination is capricious, or hot 
supported by the evidence. ' l n t *> 
(4) If the final determination of the executive 
director is not consistent with the findings of fact 
and conclusions of law recommended by the hearing 
officer, the executive director shall prepare and file 
with the court at the time of filing the answer to the 
petition, findings of fact and conclusions of law to 
support the final determination of the executive 
director. The petitioner shall have 15 days after 
receipt of the executive director's findings of fact 
and conclusions of law to amend the petition for 
review. The court may affirm or amend the final 
determination of the executive director, or require 
further or additional testimony necessary to be 
taken, and issue an order based on its own findings 
of fact and conclusions of law. -« ? j
 tv \7 «< "~' 1*87 
26-23-2. (Effective January 1, 1988). T . 
Administrative review of actions of department or 
director. - ^ 
Any person aggrieved by any action or inaction of 
the department or its executive director may request 
agency action and appropriate adjudicative procee-
dings. Hearings shall be conducted in a manner 
which guarantees the parties' due process rights. 
This includes, but is not limited to, the right to 
examine any evidence presented to the department 
or hearing officer, the right to cross-examine any 
witness, and a prohibition of ex parte communica-
tion between any party and a member of the com-
8 2 8 For Annotations, consult C< 
Utah Code Ann. § 26 
mittee or the hearing officer. Final rules incorpora-
ting these procedures shall be adopted by,the com-
mittee on or before October 1,1988. ^ n n-M 19S7 
26-23-3. Violation of public health laws or orders, r h 
unlawful. * « i' » " r /r 3?"f <M 
It shall be unlawful for any person, association, 
or corporation, and the officers thereof: ' » * •^**-
1
 (1) to willfully violate, disobey, or disregard the 
provisions of the public health laws or the terms of 
any lawful notice, order, standard, rule, or regular 
tion issued thereunder; or /*' » »n-i * **••*«. 
(2) to fail to remove or abate from private prop-
erty under the person's control at his own expense, 
within 48 hours, or such other reasonable time as 
the health authorities shall determine, after being 
ordered to do so by the health authorities, any nui-
sance, source of filth, • cause of sickness, dead 
animal, health hazard, or sanitation violation within 
the jurisdiction and control of the department, 
whether the person, association, or corporation shall 
be the owner, tenant, or occupant of such property; 
provided, however, when any such condition is due 
to an act of God, it shall be removed at public 
expense; or , , i , 
(3) to pay, give, present, or otherwise convey to 
any officer or employee of the department any gift, 
remuneration or other consideration, directly or 
indirectly, which such officer or employee is forbi-
dden to receive by the provisions of this chapter. 
(4) to fail to make or file reports required by law 
or rule of the department relating to the existence of 
disease or other facts and ^statistics relating to the 
public health. ' ' ' , , \ * ' m i 
26-23-4. Unlawful acts by department officers \,,
 f„r 
and employees.
 ; ' _ 
It shall be unlawful, for any officer or„ employee 
of the department: ' ' \
 tf , 
(1) To accept any gift, remuneration, or other 
consideration, directly or indirectly \, for an incor-
rect or improper performance of the duties imposed 
upon him by or in behalf of the department or by 
the provisions of this chapter. ' ~* ' - -» * — 
(2) To perform any work, labor, or services other 
than the duties assigned to him on behalf of the 
department during the hours such officer or empl-
oyee is regularly employed by the department, or to 
perform his duties as an officer or employee of the 
department under any condition or arrangement that 
involves a violation of this or any other law j>f the 
state. ' r > * > . •* " ' '" ' m i 
26-23-5. Unlawful acts concerning certificates, n ;' 
' records and reports - Unlawful transportation or 
acceptance of dead human body. x' * ' 3 
It shall be unlawful for any person, association, 
or corporation and the officers thereof:' s i , 
(1) to willfully and knowingly make any false 
statement in a certificate, record, or report required 
to be filed with the department, or in an application 
for a certified copy of a vital record, or to willfully 
and knowingly supply false information intending 
that such information be used in the preparation of 
any such report, record, or certificate or amendment 
thereof; * r" ' < " : ^ 
' (2) to make, counterfeit* alter, amend, or mutilate 
any certificate, record, or report required to be filed 
under this code or a certified copy of such certifi-
cate, record, or report without lawful authority and 
with the intent to deceive;
 5» „ ' > 
(3) to willfully and knowingly obtain, possess, 
use, sell, furnish, or attempt to obtain, possess, use, 
sell, or furnish to another,, for any purpose of dec-
• C o ' s Annotation Service 
23 -2 (3 ) 
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411 Exempt Assets 
Allow the following exemptions for medical assistance cases other than 
Indigent Medical cases. See Section 807 for exemptions specific to 
Indigent Medical cases. If an asset is not treated in that section, use 
the F or C policy. 
1. One Home and Lot - All Cases 
Exclude one home, including a mobile home, and lot owned or being 
purchased and occupied by the client. 
a. F and G Cases - The lot on which the home stands shall not 
exceed the average size of residential lots in the community 
where it is. Count the equity value of property exceeding an 
average size lot, 
b. A. B and D Cases - Exempt the home and all contiguous property. 
Exempt a life estate in a home if the owner of the life estate 
continues to live in the home. 
2. One Home and Lot of a Person in a Nursine, Home - All Cases 
When a person who owns a home, or life estate in a home, becomes a 
resident of a nursing home, the home or life estate becomes countable 
unless: 
a. The person's stay in the nursing home will be short term. A 
stay is short term if a doctor says that the client is likely to 
return home within 6 months of admission. Anyone in a nursing 
home more than 6 months after admission is long term. 
or b. The person states that he intends to return home. It does not 
matter whether the person actually returns home within 6 
months. There is no time limit to this exemption. The 
statement of intent must be in writing from the client or his 
representative. 
or c. The person has a spouse, dependent child, or relative* who lives 
in the home. 
3. Water Rights - All Cases 
Exclude water rights attached to a house and lot. 
Relative: son, daughter, grandson, granddaughter, stepson, stepdaughter, 
in-laws, mother, father, stepmother, stepfather, half-sister, 
half-brother, niece, nephew, grandmother, grandfather, aunt, 
uncle, sister, brother, stepbrother, or stepsister 
B-87-02-APA 
APA Vol. Ill § 411.1 
§ 233.20 45 CFR Ch. II (10-1-87 Edition) 
18 years of age or older and perma-
nently and totally disabled. 
(3) Federal financial participation is 
available in assistance payments made 
for the entire month in accordance 
with* the State plan if the individual 
was eligible for a portion of the 
month, provided that the individual 
was eligible on the date that the pay-
ment was made; except that where it 
has been determined that the State 
agency had previously denied assist-
ance to which the individual was enti-
tled, Federal financial participation 
will be provided in any corrective pay-
ment regardless of whether the indi-
vidual is eligible on the date that the 
corrective payment is made. 
(4) Federal financial participation is 
available in assistance payments 
which are continued in accordance 
with the State plan, for a temporary 
period during which the effects of an 
eligibility condition are being over-
come, e.g., blindness in AB, disability 
in APTD, physical or mental incapac-
ity, continued absence of a parent, or 
unemployment of a principal earner I in 
AFDC. J 
(5) Where changed circumstances or 
a hearing decision makes the individ-
ual ineligible for any assistance, or eli-
gible for a smaller amount of assist-
ance than was actually paid, Federal 
financial participation is available in 
excess payments to such individuals, 
for not more than one month follow-
ing the month in which the circum-
stances changed or the hearing deci-
sion was rendered. Federal financial 
participation is available where assist-
ance is required to be continued unad-
justed because a hearing has been re-
quested. 
(Sec. 1102, Social Security Act, as amended, 
49 Stat. 647, as amended; 42 U.S.C. 1302 and 
Part XXIII of Pub. L. 97-35, 95 Stat. 843) 
[36 FR 3866. Feb. 27, 1971, as amended at 38 
FR 8744. Apr. 6, 1973; 39 FR 26912, July 24, 
1974; 40 FR 32958. Aug. 5, 1975; 47 FR 5674, 
Feb. 5, 1982; 47 FR 47828, Oct. 28, 1982; 51 
FR 9204, Mar. 18, 1986] 
§ 233.20 Need and amount of assistance. 
(a) Requirements for State Plans. A 
State Plan for OAA, AFDC, AB, 
APTD or AABD must, as specified 
below: 
(1) General (i) Provide that the de-
termination of need and amount of as-
sistance for all applicants and recipi-
ents will be made on an objective and 
equitable basis and all types of income 
will be taken into consideration in the 
same way except where otherwise spe-
cifically authorized by Federal statute 
and 
(ii) Provide that individuals receiv-
ing SSI benefits under title XVI, for 
the period for which such benefits are 
received, shall not be included in the 
AFDC assistance unit for purposes of 
determining need and the amount of 
the assistance payment. Under this re-
quirement, "individuals receiving SSI 
benefits under title XVI" includes in-
dividuals receiving mandatory or op-
tional State supplementary payments 
under section 1616(a) of the Act or 
under section 212 of Pub. L. 93-66. 
(2) Standards of assistance, (i) Speci-
fy a statewide standard, expressed in 
money amounts, to be used in deter-
mining (a) the need of applicants and 
recipients and (6) the amount of the 
assistance payment. 
(ii) In the AFDC plan, provide that 
by July 1, 1969, the State's standard of 
assistance for the AFDC program will 
have been adjusted to reflect fully 
changes in living costs since such 
standards were established, and any 
maximums that the State imposes on 
the amount of aid paid to families will 
have been proportionately adjusted. 
In such adjustment a consolidation of 
the standard (i.e., combining of items) 
may not result in a reduction in the 
content of the standard. In the event 
the State is not able to meet need in 
full under the adjusted standard, the 
State may make ratable reductions in 
accordance with paragraph (a)(3)(viii) 
of this section. Nevertheless, if a State 
maintains a system of dollar maxi-
mums these maximums must be pro-
portionately adjusted in relation to 
the updated standards. 
(iii) Provide that the standard will 
be uniformly applied throughout the 
State except as provided under 
§ 239.54. 
(iv) Include the method used in de-
termining need and the amount of the 
assistance payment. For AFDC, the 
method must provide for rounding 
down to the next lower whole dollar 
102 
45 C . F . R . § 2 3 3 . 2 0 ( a ) ( 3 ) ( B ) 
Office of Family Assistance, Fam. Supp. Admin., HHS § 233.20 
when the result of determining the 
standard of need or the payment 
amount is not a whole dollar. Prora-
tion under § 206.10(a)(6)(i)(D) to de-
termine the amount of payment for 
the month of application must occur 
before rounding to determine the pay-
ment amount for that month. 
(v) If the State agency includes spe-
cial need items in its standard, (A) de-
scribe those that will be recognized 
and the circumstances under which 
they will be included, and (B) provide 
that they will be considered for all ap-
plicants and recipients requiring them; 
except that under AFDC, work ex-
penses and child care (or care of inca-
pacitated adults living in the same 
home and receiving AFDC) resulting 
from employment or participation in 
either a CWEP or an employment 
search program cannot be special 
needs. 
(vi) If the State chooses to establish 
the need of the individual on a basis 
that recognizes, as essential to his 
well-being, the presence in the home 
of other needy individuals, (a) specify 
the persons whose needs will be in-
cluded in the individual's need, and (6) 
provide that the decision as to wheth-
er any individual will be recognized as 
essential to the recipient's well-being 
shall rest with the recipient, 
(vii) [Reserved] 
(viii) Provide that the money 
amount of any need item included in 
the standard will not be prorated or 
otherwise reduced solely because of 
the presence in the household of a 
non-legally responsible individual; and 
the agency will not assume any contri-
bution from such individual for the 
support of the assistance unit except 
as provided in paragraphs (a)(3)(xiv) 
and (a)(5) of this section and § 233.51 
of this part. 
(3) Income and resources, (i) (A) 
OAA, AB, APTD, AABD, Specify the 
amount and types of real and personal 
property, including liquid assets, that 
may be reserved, i.e., retained to meet 
the current and future needs while as-
sistance is received on a continuing 
basis. In addition to the home, person-
al effects, automobile and income pro-
ducing property allowed by the 
agency, the amount of real and per-
sonal property, including liquid assets, 
that can be reserved for each individ-
ual recipient shall not be in excess of 
two thousand dollars. Policies may 
allow reasonable proportions of 
income from businesses or farms to be 
used to increase capital assets, so that 
income may be increased; and (B) in 
AFDC—The amount of real and per-
sonal property that can be reserved 
for each assistance unit shall not be in 
excess of one thousand dollars equity 
value (or such lesser amount as the 
State specifies in its State plan) ex-
cluding only: 
(1) The home which is the usual res-
idence of the assistance unit; 
(2) One automobile, up to $1,500 of 
equity value or such lower limit as; the 
State may specify in the State plan; 
(any excess equity value must be ap-
plied towards the general resource 
limit specified in the State plan); 
(3) One burial plot (as defined in the 
State plan) for each member of the as-
sistance unit; 
(4) Bona fide funeral agreements (as 
defined and within limits specified in 
the State plan) up to a total of $1,500 
of equity value or such lower limit as 
the State may specify in the State 
plan for each member of the assist-
ance unit; 
(5) Real property for a period of six 
months (or at the option of the State, 
nine months) which the family is 
making a good faith effort (as defined 
in the State plan) to sell subject to fol-
lowing provisions. The family must 
sign an agreement to dispose of the 
property and to repay the amount of 
aid received during such period that 
would not have been paid had the 
property been sold at the beginning of 
such period, but not to exceed the 
amount of the net proceeds of the 
sale. If the property has not been sold 
within the specified time period, or if 
eligibility stops for any other reason, 
the entire amount of aid paid during 
such period will be treated as an over-
payment; and 
(6) At State option, basic mainte-
nance items essential to day-to-day 
living such as clothes, furniture and 
other similarly essential items of limit-
ed value. 
(ii) Provide that in determining need 
and the amount of the assistance pay-
ment, after all policies governing the 
45 C . P . R . g 2 3 3 . 2 0 ( a ) (3) (B) 
i Care Financing Administration, 
CALLY NEEDY INCOME STANDARDS 
11 Medically needy income stand-
Is: General requirements. 
letermine eligibility of medically 
individuals, a Medicaid agency 
use an income standard under 
ibpart that is— 
lased on family size; 
Jniform for all individuals in a 
d group; 
?or p p p purposes, not in excess 
Vb percent of the highest money 
>nt that ordinarily would be 
in the State APDC program to 
ividual or a family of compara-
e (see § 435.1007); and 
Reasonable (see § 435.812). 
47987, Sept. 30. 19813 
2 Medically needy income stand-
Is: Reasonableness. 
'he agency must use a medically 
income standard that is reason-
The following medically n^edy 
> standards are presumed to be 
able: 
'he agency provides one medical-
dy income standard for all cov-
[ledically needy groups. Except 
vided in paragraphs (c) and (d) 
i section, the standard must at 
qual the highest income or pay-
itandard used to determine eligi-
in the cash assistance programs 
optional State supplement, if 
jency provides Medicaid under 
30) related to the covered medi-
eedy groups. 
?he agency provides a different 
illy needy income standard for 
jovered medically needy group. 
: as provided in paragraphs (c) 
I) of this section, the standard 
ch covered group must at least 
:he income or payment standard 
;o determine eligibility in the 
ssistance program (or an option-
e supplement, if the agency pro-
Vledicaid under § 435.230) relat-
that covered medically needy 
The agency may use a lower 
illy needy income standard than 
andards specified in paragraph 
this section if— 
?he income standard used under 
aph (b) of this section exceeds 
HS § 435.821 
the maximum dollar amount on 
income allowed for purposes of FFP 
under § 435.1007; and 
(2) The lower income standard at 
least equals the maximum amount al-
lowed for purposes of FFP. 
(d) In the case of an agency that 
provides Medicaid for the aged, blind, 
or disabled individuals only if they 
meet more restrictive requirements 
than used under SSI, the following 
provisions apply: 
(1) The agency may use an income 
standard for those individuals that is 
lower than the standard specified in 
paragraph (b) of this section. 
(2) The lower standard must at least 
equal the medically needy income 
standard for those aged, blind, or dis-
abled individuals under the State's 
plan on January 1, 1972. 
(e) If the agency uses a medically 
needy income standard not specified in 
paragraphs (b) through (d) of this sec-
tion— 
(1) That standard is not presumed to 
be reasonable; and 
C2) HCFA must approve the stand-
ard. 
[46 FR 47987, Sept. 30, 1981] 
§435.813 [Reservedl 
§435.814 Medically needy income stand-
ards: State plan requirements. 
(a) The State plan must specify the 
income standard for each covered 
medically needy group. 
(b) If the agency uses an income 
standard that is not presumed to be 
reasonable under § 435.812, the State 
plan must describe that standard. 
[46 FR 47987, Sept. 30, 1981] 
FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF 
RELATIVES 
§435.821 Financial responsibility of rela-
tives: Individuals under age 21 and 
caretaker relatives. 
(a) The agency must meet the re-
quirements of this section in determin-
ing eligibility— 
(1) Under §435.308 of medically 
needy individuals under age 21; and 
(2) Under §435.310 of medically 
needy caretaker relatives. 
42 C . F . R . §§ 4 3 5 . 8 1 2 - . 8 1 4 
§ 435.840 42 CFR Ch. IV (10-1-85 E 
supplement recipients under § 435.230; 
or 
(iii) The amount of the highest 
medically needy income standards for 
one person established under 
§ 435.814. 
(3) For an individual with a family 
at home, an additional amount for the 
maintenance needs of the family. This 
amount must— 
(i) Be based on a reasonable assess-
ment of their financial need; 
(ii) Be adjusted for the number of 
family members living in the home; 
and 
(iii) Not exceed the highest of the 
following need standards for a family 
of the same size: 
(A) The standard used to determine 
eligibility under the State's approved 
AFDC plan. 
(B) The standards used to determine 
eligibility under the State's Medicaid 
plan, as provided for in § 435.814. 
(4) Amounts for incurred expenses 
for medical or remedial care that are 
not subject to payment by a third 
party, including— 
(i) Medicare and other health insur-
ance premiums, deductibles, or coin-
surance charges; and 
(ii) Necessary medical or remedial 
care recognized under State law but 
not covered under the State's Medic-
aid plan, subject to reasonable limits 
the agency may establish on amounts 
of these expenses. 
(d) In determining the amount of 
the individual's income to be used to 
reduce the agency's payment to the in-
stitution, the agency may,, for single 
individuals, deduct an amount (in ad-
dition to the personal needs allow-
ance) for maintenance of the individ-
ual's home if— 
(1) The amount is deducted for not 
more than a 6-month period; and 
(2) A physician has certified that the 
individual is likely to return to his 
home within that period, 
[45 PR 24886, Apr. 11, 1980, as amended at 
46 PR 47988, Sept. 30, 1981; 48 FR 5735, 
Feb. 8, 1983] 
MEDICALLY N E E D Y R E S O U R C E STA; 
§435.840 Medically needy resource 
ards: General requirements. 
To determine eligibility of me 
needy individuals, a Medicaid 
must use a resource standard 
this subpart that is— 
(a) Based on family size; 
(b) Uniform for all individua 
group; and 
(c) Reasonable. (See § 435.841: 
[46 FR 47988, Sept. 30, 1981; 46 F3 
Nov. 11, 1981] 
§ 435.841 Medically needy resourc 
ards: Reasonableness. 
(a) The agency must use a m< 
needy resource standard that 
sonable, according to the provi* 
this section. 
(b) The following medically 
resource standards are presume 
reasonable: 
(1) The agency provides one r 
ly needy resource standard for 
ered medically needy groups, 
as provided in paragraph (c) 
section, the standard must i 
equal the highest resource s 
used to determine eligibility 
cash assistance programs rel 
the covered medically needy gr 
(2) The agency provides a d 
medically needy resource stan< 
each covered medically needj 
Except as provided in paragrar. 
this section, the standard for e 
ered group must at least eq 
highest resource standard use 
termine eligibility in the casl 
ance program related to that 
medically needy group. 
(c) In the case of an agency t 
vides Medicaid for the aged, 1 
disabled individuals only if th 
more restrictive requiremen 
used under SSI, the followin 
sions apply: 
(1) The agency may use a 
standard for those individual 
lower than the standard spe 
paragraph (b) of this section. 
(2) The lower standard musl 
equal the medically needy 
standard for those aged, blin< 
abled individuals under the 
plan on January 1, 1972. 
42 C.F .R . §§ 4 3 5 . 8 4 0 - , 8 4 3 
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i If the agency uses a medically 
ly resource standard not specified 
aragraphs (b) and (c) of this see-
That standard is not presumed to 
asonable; and 
HCPA must approve the stand-
R 47988, Sept. 30, 1981; 46 PR 54743, 
11, 1981] 
343 Medically needy resource stand-
rds: State plan requirements. 
The State plan must specify the 
rce standard for each covered 
jally needy group. 
If the agency uses a resource 
ard that is not presumed to be 
liable under § 435.841, the State 
nust describe that standard. 
i 47989, Sept. 30, 1981] 
IMINING ELIGIBILITY ON THE BASIS 
OF RESOURCES 
45 Medically needy resource eligi-
ity. 
letermine eligibility on the basis 
ources for medically needy indi-
s, the agency m u s t -
consider only the individual's re-
s and those that are considered 
Die to him under the financial 
isibility requirements for rela-
in §435.821, §435.822, or 
23; 
Consider only resources available 
the period for which income is 
ted under § 435.831(a); 
or individuals under age 21 and 
ter relatives, deduct the value of 
:es that would be deducted in 
lining eligibility under the 
AFDC plan; 
'or aged, blind, or disabled indi-
in States covering all SSI re-
s, deduct the value of resources 
juld be deducted in determining 
ity under SSI; 
) Por aged, blind, or disabled in-
is in States using requirements 
estrictive than SSI, deduct the 
)f resources in an amount no 
estrictive than those deducted 
he Medicaid plan on January 1, 
id no more liberal than those 
id in determining eligibility 
SSI. 
(2) However, the amounts specified 
in paragraph (e)(1) of this section 
must be the same as those that would 
be deducted in determining, under 
§ 435.121, the eligibility of the categor-
ically needy; and 
(f) Apply the resource standards es-
tablished under § 435.843. 
[43 PR 45204, Sept. 29, 1978, as amended at 
45 FR 24886, Apr. 11, 1980; 46 FR 47989, 
Sept. 30, 1981] 
TREATMENT OF INCOME AND RESOURCES 
§ 435.850 Treatment of income and re-
sources: General requirements. 
To determine eligibility of medically 
needy individuals, a Medicaid agency 
must use a methodology for the treat-
ment of income and resources that is— 
(a) Uniform for all individuals in a 
covered group; and 
(b) Reasonable (see § 435.851). 
[46 FR 47989, Sept. 30, 1981] 
§ 435.851 Treatment of income and re-
sources: Reasonableness. 
(a) The agency must use a methodol-
ogy for the treatment of income and 
resources, to determine eligibility of 
the medically needy, that is reasona-
ble. 
(b) The methodology used to deter-
mine eligibility of individuals in the 
cash assistance program related to the 
covered medically needy group is pre-
sumed to be reasonable. 
(c) If the agency provides Medicaid 
for the aged, blind, or disabled individ-
uals who meet more restrictive re-
quirements than used under SSI, the 
methodology for the treatment of 
income and resources of those aged, 
blind, or disabled individuals under 
the State's plan on January 1, 1972, is 
presumed to be reasonable. 
(d) If the agency uses a methodology 
not described in paragraphs (b) and (c) 
of this section— 
(1) The methodology is not pre-
sumed to be reasonable; and 
(2) HCPA must approve that meth-
odology. 
[46 FR 47989, Sept. 30, 1981] 
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General of Utah, at State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84114, and RUTH L. RENLUND, Assistant Attorney Gener-
al, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84114, 
via First-class U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, this *y day 
of <{uuryiP , 1988. 
lichael E. Bulson 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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